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Abstract
The essay elaborates on the manuscript tradition of transmission, commentary, and glossing of fiqh or
“Islamic jurisprudence” texts in medieval and early-modern juridical culture from the Indian sub-continent.
Premodern Muslim jurists composed doctrinal treatises primarily in Arabic, the shared theological
language of the ‘ulamā’ or “learned scholars”. However, in the Indian context, Persian too had acquired the
status of a language of Islamic law. From the fourteenth century, fatāwā compilations were made in
Persian. By seventeenth-century Mughal rule in northern India, sharḥ or “commentary” and ḥāshiya or
“super-commentary” in Persian were deployed as a mechanism for pedagogical transmission. Analyzing
two extant Persian manuscripts pertaining to the Ḥanafī madhhab or “school” of juridical thought,
Fatāwā-i fīrūzshāhī (fourteenth century) and ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Sajādil Sirhindī’s Sharḥ-i hidāya (seventeenth
century), the essay appraises the nature of textual and manuscript practices involved in generating
Islamic juridical norms and practices. Examining philological and textual features exhibited internal to
these two texts, I argue that fiqh doctrinal writing in the age of post-classical Islamic sciences (twelfth to
eighteenth Centuries) had become “hybrid” in style. Rather than indicating tendencies towards a phase of
“decline” due to “orthodox” adherence to tradition, such texts of legal genre portray a complex culture of
Islamic law-making in the premodern period.
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Prefatory Notes on Persian Idioms of Islamic
Jurisprudence: Reasoning and Procedures
of Law-Making in Premodern Islamicate India
Naveen K a na lu

University of California, Los Angeles

T

he Indian subcontinent was one of the prominent regions in
Eastern Islamicate lands for the production and circulation of
Islamic manuscripts in the premodern period. While Persian was
predominantly employed as the language of administration and court culture, Arabic was, however, the primary language of theologico-religious
discourses in diﬀerent branches of Islamic thought such as tafsīr (Qur’anic
exegesis), kalām (theology), and ﬁqh (jurisprudence). Compared with premodern Persian works, Arabic treatises produced in the Indian subcontinent
have o en been neglected in contemporary scholarship, despite the region
housing one of the largest collections of Arabic manuscripts in the world.
This is largely due to the fact that modern Western academic debates has
privileged the study of Islamic thought om the Middle Eastern countries
where Arabic is the spoken language as well as the language of the literati.
Moreover, South Asian scholars have barely studied the corpus of Arabic texts
made in the subcontinent.1 Hence, we know little about the transmission,

1 For a general survey, see Tahera Qutbuddin, “Arabic in India: A Survey and Classiﬁcation
of Its Uses, Compared with Persian,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 127, no. 3 (2007):
315–3
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transcription, and circulation of Arabic manuscripts in the Indian subcontinent, and even less concerning various ways in which Persian acted as an
intermediary language for the pedagogical and doctrinal diﬀusion of Islamic
knowledge systems available in Arabic to the wider locales of Persianspeaking elite subjects. In the present article, I analyze the trajectories of
ﬁqh (Islamic jurisprudence) texts, doctrines, and ideas among ‘ulamā’ (sing.
‘ālim) or “learned scholars” of the Ḥanafī madhhab (school) of Sunni jurisprudence in Hindūstān (the northern territories of India). Critically engaging with two works in Persian, I demonstrate some salient linguistic
registers and styles that help us portray continuities and diﬀerences of
Persian texts of law om well-established conventions in Arabic. Through
this study, I make a case for the reassessment of Persian as not only the
language of political power but equally the language of law.2
Premodern Muslim jurists divided ﬁqh into two distinct domains: uṣūl
al-ﬁqh (the principles of jurisprudence) that furnished legal-theoretic reﬂection and furū‘ al-ﬁqh (the branches of jurisprudence) that were properly
concerned with the elaboration of legal precepts that were applicable to various aspects of individual, social, and political life of Muslims. While the
former domain broadly pertains to modern conceptions of legal philosophy
involving logical methods necessary for legal reasoning, the latter relates
to the practical application of legal reasoning to derive legal precepts.
Through the early centuries of Islamic jurisprudence, these precepts were
elaborated to constitute a large corpus that formed the basis for substantive
law. Both these domains belong to human interpretation of sharī‘a or
“God’s law.” Muslim jurists reasoned that God’s law in its essence was
unknowable. However, the deployment of ‘aql (reason) was considered
essential to elaborate legal precepts, which could asymptotically tend, even

2 For the cosmopolitan nature of Persian and its political signiﬁcance, see Muzaﬀar Alam,
The Languages of Political Islam in India, Circa 1200–1800 (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004).
Critical assessments of the philological and institutional vitality of Persian as a court language
can be found in Muhammad Abdul Ghani, A History of Persian Language and Literature at the
Mughal Court, with a Brief Survey of the Growth of Urdu Language, Parts I–II (Allahabad: The
Indian Press, 1929); Momin Mohiuddin, Chancellary and Persian Epistolography Under the
Mughals: From Bábur to Sháh Jahán (1526–1658): A Study on Inshá’, Dár al-Inshá’ and Munshís, Based on Original Documents (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1971).

https://repository.upenn.edu/mss_sims/vol4/iss1/5

6

Kanalu: Prefatory Notes on Persian Idioms of Islamic Jurisprudence

Kanalu, Law- Making in Premodern India | 95

if in a fallible manner, toward the hidden truth of God’s law. This was
because reason itself was a human attribute bestowed by God; the right application of his law for the right conduct of a Muslim necessarily required
human interpretation.
Plural forms of textual practices prevailed in the elaboration of Ḥanafī
jurisprudence in the Indian subcontinent. Formulating legal precepts and
constructing syllogistic arguments for their derivation required a juridicotechnical language that Arabic possessed through the jurisprudential and
theological tradition. Persian, as employed in the Indian context, never
assumed such a position. The hybrid forms we ﬁnd in Persian works of
Islamic law attest to a pragmatic “core” for the composition of such texts.
They were rarely centered on legal philosophical problems or the epistemic
reasons underlying rule-making, that is, uṣūl al-ﬁqh. Rather, Persian works
oﬀered doctrinally appropriate rules for right conduct for Muslim individuals in their quotidian pietistic rites.
In the ﬁrst section, I develop a brief overview of the range of Islamic
jurisprudential works that were prevalent in the premodern period when
northern Indian territories were under the rule of various Delhi Sultanates
(ca. 1200–1526) and the Mughal Empire at the height of its suzerainty (1526
to early 1700s). In the second section, I elaborate on various forms of juridical methods that acted as a primary vehicle for textual transmission. These
include sharḥ (commentary) and ḥāshiya (gloss) that were meant as pedagogical guides. They also constituted the means by which juridical opinion was
used to express a common belonging to the respective madhhab (school), in
this case, the Ḥanafī one. In the ﬁnal section, I illustrate elements of content
and pattern in two Persian texts, Fatāwā-i fīrūzshāhī and Sharḥ-i hidāya, to
understand the possible ways in which Persian was deployed by jurists for a
genre of writing dominated by Arabic.
Explicating signiﬁcant patterns found in these texts, the article reassesses
the nature of transmission of juridical doctrine om Arabic to Persian in the
premodern context. I illustrate authorial attitudes toward the justiﬁcation of
rules, norms of commenting on previous texts, and more prominently, limits
and possibilities of creating thought in a language that lacked the technicality to be a language of law in its immediacy since Arabic had been the
standard vehicle for legal production. The composition of theological and
Published by ScholarlyCommons, 2019
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doctrinal works in Persian had been a common feature in Iran and Central
Asia as much as Persian was used for works on personal piety and ritual in
the premodern period. The theologian Ghazali’s (ca. 1058–1111) Kīmīya-i
sa‘ādat is, perhaps, the most notable example. Yet, we know little about Persian
legal writing in the Indian subcontinent.
As opposed to a large body of modern scholarship on the formative
centuries of the classical period (eighth to twel h centuries), the postclassical period remains understudied. This is largely due to the dominance
of questions concerning the “origins” of Islamic thought in general and
Islamic law in particular since orientalists began to study them in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, as far as Islamic jurisprudence is concerned,
there was a consensus held in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century idea
that the gate of ĳtihād (interpretative reasoning) had been closed by the end
of the Abbasid Caliphate.3 Derivatively, much of our contemporary understanding of the post-classical period is postulated on the idea that later
treatises and commentaries were merely repetitive in nature and rigidly
adhered to established dogma. This idea has entertained the opinion that
no signiﬁcant innovations or variations occurred in Islamic jurisprudence
om the thirteenth century onwards. Muslim jurists were supposed to have
accepted constituted knowledge systems within their jurisprudence.
This position, which was advanced by nineteenth-century orientalists,
has been increasingly questioned through the study of commentarial practices as well as scholarly networks that existed in the premodern period.4
However, in exploring the nature of ﬁqh discourses in the Indian

3 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964),
69–7 Also see Noel J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1964), 182–20
4 See Khaled El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly
Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015), 1–10, for an appraisal of this question in the Middle Eastern context. For a general
survey of Islamic theological networks in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Indian subcontinent, see Asad Q. Ahmed and Reza Pourjavardy, “Theology in the Indian Subcontinent,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 606–⒓
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subcontinent, we are further constrained by the fact that the production
and circulation of Islamic thought largely overlaps with the post-classical
period as Islamic intellectual culture in the region emerged much later than
in the Middle East. This leads to a diﬃcult presupposition that Islamic
knowledge systems in the subcontinent merely imitated established practices om elsewhere. However, there are several diﬃculties in making such
judgments. Even a partial illustration of this intellectual history requires
the knowledge of manuscript circulation and commentarial practices involving annotations, marginalia, and glossaries. First, we have little knowledge
of the manuscripts themselves and the proliferation of various genres of
legal disputations. Second, due to the neglect in the study of manuscript
circulation among various intellectual networks, little philological and textcritical study, let alone an elaborate reconstruction of Islamic intellectual
history, has appeared so far in the Indian context.5 As a corollary, the contents, doctrines, and positions within classical jurisprudential texts are very
o en considered the locus classicus without accounting for successive iterations of the intellectual culture in the premodern period. A clariﬁcation of
these diﬃculties requires us to rethink ﬁqh production in the subcontinent
as a continuum with Transoxanian juridical thought that widely proliferated in the region since at least the thirteenth century.
What were the interpretative mechanisms that premodern Ḥanafī jurists
used to develop positive legal norms, and what were the variations in their
jurisprudential style? I examine this concern through a reading of manuscripts of two types of juridical texts belonging to furū‘ al-ﬁqh: fatāwā (sing.
fatwā; collations of legal precepts) and sharḥ (commentary), both composed
in Persian. The former is Sadr al-Dīn Ya‘qūb Muzaﬀar Kirmānī’s Fatāwā-i
fīrūzshāhī (known sometimes as Fiqh-i fīrūzshāhī) om the fourteenth century, and the latter is ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Sajādil Sirhindī’s Sharḥ-i hidāya om
the late seventeenth-century Mughal Empire. Critically analyzing the
internal construction of these two works that remain in manuscript form to

5 A handful of fatāwā and sharḥ texts were edited and lithographed in the nineteenth
century and rendered into modern Urdu. However, none of these texts have been translated
into English.
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date, I argue not only for the persistence and development of Islamic juridical thought in the post-classical Islamic period (twel h to eighteenth centuries) but equally its diﬀusion in Persian.

Forms of Constructing Juridical Discourse: Genres and Texts
The production of furū‘ al-ﬁqh texts in the Indian subcontinent spans om
as early as the thirteenth century to the nineteenth century under late
colonial British rule. The dominant genre of legal writings is known as
fatāwā.6 Though the original meaning of the term fatwā in Arabic designates a responsa issued by a muftī (jurisconsult), in premodern jurisprudence,
fatawā had become a genre of legal writing.7 These texts were collations of
legal precepts and positions of jurists that were arranged in kitābs (books)
dealing with various aspects of personal conduct such as puriﬁcation, ablution, performance of prayer, as well as conduct that was intersubjective in
nature, namely, marriage, divorce, commerce, sale, and so on. Fatawā collections, as they developed in the Indian subcontinent, were not merely a set
of responsa issued against a legal opinion sought by an individual om a
muftī. Instead they collated the diﬀerent states and stages of right conduct
that a Muslim individual had to abide by. Given the structural nature
of Islamic law, which was not a law amed by political authorities such
as the Sultan, it emerged as a jurists’ law brought about by consensus,
disagreement, and interpretation within an established tradition such as
the Ḥanafī school.8 Fatawā were, therefore, collations that did not rationalize conﬂicts of interpretation on a particular matter but involved only
the enunciation of diﬀerent juridical positions to provide a comprehensive

6 Zafarul Islam, “Origin and Development of Fatāwā Compilation in Medieval India,”
Studies in History 12, no. 2 (1996): 223–2
7 In premodern Islamic jurisprudential culture, the following distinctions of juridical oﬃces
and positions are relevant: fuqahā’ (sing. faqīh; jurists), muftūn (sing. mufti; jurisconsults), and
quḍāt (sing. qāḍī; magistrates). Scholars o en combined two or more of these functions. They
were generically called ‘ulamā’ (sing. ‘ālim; learned scholars).
8 Wael B. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 57–8
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understanding of how previous jurists of the madhhab or “school” (designated aṣḥābunā) reﬂected regrouping of the positions on any legal proposition or opinion. Al-fatāwā al-‘ālamkīrīyya (Institutions of the World
Conqueror), compiled in the 1660s at the Mughal imperial court by the
order of emperor Aurangzeb ‘Ālamgīr (r. 1658–1707), not so much lays out
legal deﬁnitions and explanations as appraises the positions of previous
jurists. For instance, on matters pertaining to how kharāj (land tax) had to
be imposed, the rate of taxation based on the quality and other conditions
of land, the appropriate period of collection, and whether tax could be collected in cash or in kind, the authors expose us to the doctrines of works
such as Abū Yūsuf ’s (d. 767) Kitāb al-kharāj, previous fatāwā collections
such as Fatāwā-i qāḍīkhān.9
The proliferation of these compilations and collations over several centuries constituted a corpus by themselves of legal writing that not only
provided referential compendia to locate divergent legal positions of Ḥanafī
jurists but also allowed later jurists to read them to synthesize the diﬀerences and form their own legal opinion. Premodern Muslim jurists gained
reputation not only through their deep knowledge of the legal corpus but,
more importantly, their ability to interpret them, distinguish between general and particular propositions, and syllogistically derive their own legal
position based on reasoning. With the notable exception of Al-fatāwā al‘ālamkīrīyya that was compiled by several jurists under the guidance of
Shaikh Nizām, most fatāwā were made by individual Ḥanafī jurists for their
rulers. To mention a few, these include ‘Ālim ibn ‘Alā Ḥanafī’s (d. 1397)
Al-fatāwā al-tātārkhānīyya, Shihāb al-Dīn Ahmad Nizām al-Jīlānī’s Al-fatāwā
al-ibrāhīmshāhīyya (sixteenth century), Muḥammad Amīn Mu’minābādī’s
Fatāwā-i amīnīya (mid-sixteenth century), and Naṣīr al-Dīn Lāhaurī’s
Fatāwā-i barahna (early seventeenth century).
From a genealogical perspective, Islamic legal texts in India owe their
origins to debates among Transoxanian jurists om the twel h century

9 Shaikh Nizām et al., Al-fatāwā al-‘ālamkīrīyya al-maʻrūfa baina al-nās bi al-fatāwā alhindīyya f ī madhhab al-imām abī ḥanīfa al-nuʻmān ta’līf jamāʻa min ʻulamā’ al-hind wa kāna
raʾīsuhum f ī ta’līﬁhā maulānā al-shaikh niẓām wa dhālika bi ’amr al-sulṭān abī al-muẓaﬀar
muhyī al-dīn muḥammad aurangzīb bahādur ʻālamkīr, vol. 2 (Cairo: s.n., 1865), 219–2
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onward, and most notably, Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥasan ibn Manṣūr al-Farghānī’s
compilation, Fatāwā-i qāḍīkhān. Beyond fatāwā compendia, Transoxanian
doctrinal writings and pedagogical guides constituted the corpus for teaching and transmission of the knowledge of ﬁqh in madrasas. Burhān al-Dīn
‘Alī ibn Bakr al-Marghīnānī’s (d. 1197) Al-hidāya sharḥ bidāyat al-mubtadı̄ fı̄
al-ﬁqh (the “Guidance”) was foremost among the Transoxanian works that
circulated in the Indian subcontinent.10 Other prominent works whose
manuscripts can be still found in collections across the subcontinent are
Imām Burhān al-Sharī‘a Mahmūd ibn al-Sharī‘a ‘Ubaid Allah’s Al-wiqāya
al-riwāya fī masā’il al-hidāya (an Arabic commentary on Al-hidāya), and
Najm al-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar ibn Muḥammad al-Nasafī’s (d. 1142) Kanz
al-daqā’iq. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rashīd al-Sajāwandī’s (ﬂ. eleventh century) treatise on inheritance laws, Farā’iḍ al-sajāwandī (commonly known
as Al-sirājīyya), also circulated widely in the teaching of inheritance and
property rights among Ḥanafī jurists.
A thorough understanding of many of these juridical works and the
manner in which they were employed in the transmission of Ḥanafī legal
doctrine is lacking. Even during the early British colonial rule, a handful of
texts were translated and commented, mainly those that colonial administrators and orientalists thought could have legal applicability and enforceability in forms such as digests, codes of law, and so on.11 The British
orientalist William Jones (1746–1794) translated Al-sirājīyya, whereas
Charles Hamilton (1753–1792) translated a Persian rendering of Al-hidāya
into English.12 Both of these Transoxanian works were, however, not texts

10 Al-hidāya was the most extensively read and commented Ḥanafī legal text in Central Asia,
the Indian subcontinent, and the territories of the Ottoman Empire in premodern times.
Several hundreds, if not thousands, of manuscripts exist in collections around the world.
11 I have argued elsewhere on the philological and legal-philosophical foundations of early
British engagement with premodern Islamic legal texts in the region. See Naveen Kanalu,
“The Pure Reason of Lex Scripta: Jurisprudential Philology and the Domain of Instituted
Laws During Early British Colonial Rule in India (1770s–1820s),” in Empires and Legal
Thought: Ideas and Institutions from the Ancient World to the Modern World, ed. Edward Cavanagh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
12 William Jones, “Al Sirájiyyah; or, The Mohammedan Law of Inheritance,” in Works of
William Jones in Six Volumes, vol. 3 (London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1799), 507–9 See
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of legal compilation such as the fatāwā, which resemble broadly what we
consider substantive law. Instead, they combined functions of transmitting
juridical knowledge in three forms, pedagogy, commentary, and doctrine,
that I will examine in the next two sections.

Post-Classical Islamic Jurisprudence:
Reasoning and Making Law
A predominant feature of post-classical Islamic juridical thought is the
extensive development of sharḥ (commentary) and ḥāshiya (super-commentary)
as a method of reading and interpreting “classical” texts. Even though their
original function was the conservation of a textual tradition, the proliferation of a vast set of commentaries on previous commentaries produced a
distinct corpus whose primary purpose was juridical reasoning on how appropriate rules could be amed.
Al-Marghīnānī’s Al-hidāya itself is a sharḥ that the Transoxanian jurist
composed on his earlier works. Ya’akov Meron has argued that the work
om the twel h century played a critical role in the shi toward a distinct
understanding of legal practice through changed reasoning supplied by
Al-Marghīnānī that has been practiced ever since.13 For instance, most
jurisprudential works composed in the period a er him closely align their
textual organization in keeping with the classiﬁcation that Al-Marghīnānī
made among the kitābs (books). More signiﬁcantly, the work seems to have
primarily supplied, given its very name, the “Guidance,” a form of pedagogical
text for teaching and transmission of legal precepts rather than constitute

Charles Hamilton, The Hedaya, or Guide: A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws, vol. 1
(London: T. Bensley, 1791).
13 See Ya’akov Meron, “Marghīnānī, His Method and His Legacy,” Islamic Law and Society
9, no. 3 (2002): 410–16, for an assessment of innovations made by Al-Marghīnānī in reorganizing the arrangement and order of kitābs (books) based on pragmatic considerations. Despite
his detailed study of Al-hidāya, Meron’s extreme position that “Post Classical verbiage is
strictly of no value om a juridical point of view” is unhelpful. Ya’akov Meron, “The Development of Legal Thought in Hanaﬁ Texts,” Studia Islamica 30 (1969): 92–9
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positive law.14 Instead, it provided the substratum for fatāwā collections. In
Wael Hallaq’s thesis, since later fatwas issued by jurisconsults had validity
over previous ones, their compilation brought about the elaboration of new
legal precepts.15 Even if the processual nature of accumulated legal precepts
formed a corpus of substantive law, this does not resolve the epistemological
question of how and when fatāwā became a historically recognized juridical
genre among jurists through their gradual detachment om the jurisconsults’ “responsa.”
In the Indian context, Al-hidāya and other Transoxanian “commentaries” in Arabic circulated at least om the thirteenth century. Persian had
already been used for compiling fatāwā by the fourteenth century. Extant
manuscript sources do not allow us to date Persian-language commentaries
though to a period prior to the early seventeenth or, at best, the late sixteenth century. It is only om the mid-seventeenth century that a range of
Transoxanian commentaries like Al-hidāya, Al-wiqāya, and Al-Sirājīyya were
commented in Persian. They explained the meaning of juridical terms as
well as propositions contained in uṣūl (sources) of law. Manuscripts of these
works abound in marginalia and, more importantly, glosses, which are a key
to discern methods of reading techniques among jurists. While marginalia
are especially useful to know the speciﬁc opinions that might have been
held, rejected, or revised in the reading, glosses oﬀer a continuous writing
across and along the text itself and hence double the act of writing, thereby,
becoming “super-commentaries” in their own right.
Manuscripts of ﬁqh om the Indian subcontinent can be found in divergent legal genres. Their signiﬁcance, however, lies in the abundance of
fatāwā, which were compiled at the instance of the rulers to oﬀer coherent
legal rules for political and administrative mechanisms in the sultanates. We
may understand these fatāwā works as equivalent to a corpus of substantive
14 The modern status of Al-hidāya as a book of legal principles to derive positive law is
largely based on colonial scholarship on Ḥanafī juridical texts. Hamilton, in particular, attributed it a “canonical authority” for making laws while it was an authoritative commentary for
premodern Ḥanafī jurists. Hamilton, The Hedaya, or Guide, xliv.
15 Wael Hallaq, “From Fatwās to Furū‘: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law,”
Islamic Law and Society 1, no. 1 (1994): 48–5
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law, for which reason they were never commented upon. Sharḥs or ḥāshiyas,
on the one hand, and, on the other, fatāwā were the major forms for the
transmission of juridical knowledge and presupposed each other’s existence
in explaining right conduct.
Commentaries by themselves were never considered suﬃcient for juridical reasoning. For premodern Ḥanafī jurists, the nomothetic principles they
followed had two layers. On the one hand, these principles were governed
by logical methods of deriving laws particular to the Muslim community.
On the other hand, since juridical reasoning formed only a part within the
application of reason, reason also transcended the particularity of ﬁqh. This
aspect is revealed implicitly in commentaries to the extent that they engage
in reasoning. However, fatāwā collections explicitly postulate the necessity
of this hypothesis to sustain the science of jurisprudence. The compilers of
Al-fatāwā al-‘ālamkīrīyya speci in their prefatory introduction that the collation of legal precepts not only does not invalidate reasoning, but requires
its active synthesis in formulating right norms for right conduct. Since mere
rule following did not suﬃce to understand appropriate action, Al-fatāwā
al-‘ālamkīrīyya internally explains the need to examine legal precepts through
the deployment of “evidence” and of “demonstration” (al-dalīl wa al-burhān).16
They are to be found in ‘aql (human reason) that is outside the content
inherent in legal precepts. Such reasoning is deeply encrusted within the
textual structure and propositional content of the work as it presents positions of distinct legal texts om the past without necessarily demonstrating
the deﬁnitive norm that could be put into practice. The method of collation
in the fatāwā, therefore, presupposes the need for sharḥ as a mode of juridical scholarship to resolve internal contradictions in the diﬀerence of opinion
among jurists involving semantic, logical, and propositional content. Sharḥs
were the jurists’ guidebooks in which the reader educated in jurisprudential
thought could apply logical and juridical reasoning.
For premodern Ḥanafī jurists in the Indian subcontinent as much as in
Transoxiana, fatāwā collections supplied the rules, whose interpretation

16 Nizām et al., Al-fatāwā al-‘ālamkīrīyya al-maʻrūfa baina al-nās bi al-fatāwā al-hindīyya, 1:
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required recourse to works such as Al-Marghīnānī’s Al-hidāya and commentaries on it. The set of early Ḥanafī juridical writings attributed to Abū
Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, and Shaybānī known collectively as ẓāhir al-riwāya
constituted valid doctrine. However, as Brannon Wheeler has pointed out,
the citation of authoritative works did not impede ikhtilāf (juristic disagreement) on the opinions of previous jurists.17 On the contrary, multiple layers
of successive commentaries allowed jurists, despite their explicit allegiance
to authoritative works, to revise their formulations in style and content
based on the purpose to which a text was put. Manuscript copies o en
reveal this hybrid nature of commentarial practices wherein the neat distinction between “paraphrasing commentary and running commentary”
proposed by L. W. C. (Eric) Van Lit for Arabic-language commentarial
works cannot be easily made within Persian legal works.18 The former, he
contends, explains a set of arguments paragraph-wise, whereas the latter
pertains to clariﬁcation at the sentence level of the text. Especially, sharḥs
composed in Persian do not reveal such distinction since they do not strictly
adhere to Arabic conventional modes of juridical explanation.
Variations in idiom, style, and composition invariably creep into premodern juridical thought, which cannot be explained through inﬂections
in “authorial intention.” Two reasons can be adduced for this process. First,
jurists are concerned with elaborating the meaning of rules, which ﬁt into
a system of reasoning that is beyond the control of any particular individual.
Instead, they are attributable to the logical procedures necessary to justi
any rule. Second, the language of law, despite diﬀerences we may ﬁnd
between juridical systems (be they Islamic, Hindu, Roman, etc.), is universally abstract in nature. Law portrays an impersonal and an atemporal voice
wherein jurists hardly interrupt legal formulation through recourse to narrative style. Even when they provide examples of legal disputes, they do so

17 Brannon M. Wheeler, “Identity in the Margins: Unpublished Ḥanafī Commentaries on
the Mukhtaṣar of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Qudūrī,” Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 2
(2003): 18
18 L. W. C. (Eric) Van Lit, “Commentary and Commentary Tradition: The Basic Terms of
Understanding Islamic Intellectual History,” MIDÉO: Mélanges de l’Institut dominicain d’études
orientales 32 (2017): 3–2
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only to the extent required om the perspective of legal resolution. The
study of textual transmission of premodern juridical texts is challenging since
law speaks to us in an un-authorial and abstract manner where the internal
cohesion of a legal norm is the primary criteria for its validity rather than
what the author believes has to be the case. This un-authorial nature of law
is mirrored in the universal validity that law claims for itself as being authoritative insofar as law stipulates rules, conditions, and conduct within a
theologico-political environment. The authority of law and its un-authorial
form are co-constituted.

Formulating Hanafī
.
Juristic Ideas: Persian Idioms of Law
Fatāwā compilations were occasionally composed in Persian in the Indian
subcontinent since at least the fourteenth century. One of the earliest works
we can date in Persian, Sadr al-Dīn Ya‘qūb Muzaﬀar Kirmānī’s Fatāwā-i
fīrūzshāhī, dedicated to the Tughlaq Sultan, Abū al-Muzaﬀar Sultān Fīrūz
Shāh (r. 1351–88) provides a rare glimpse into the establishment of a genre
of juridical writing om a generic legal instrument, fatwā, or a responsa.
Fatāwā-i fīrūzshāhī follows the pattern of ordering kitābs laid out in Alhidāya, one of its authoritative references. Yet, Kirmānī’s convention of
juridical analyses is not to adopt Al-Marghīnānī’s method of positing legal
precepts, adducing previous textual proofs to validate them, and then giving
his own exegesis upon the problem. Instead, Kirmānī understands fatāwā to
mean a collection of individual responsa made by a competent muftī (jurisconsult). Responsa was a “classical” genre of writing, but one that had a purely
practical necessity (unlike treatises or commentaries, which oﬀered clariﬁcation) known as istiftā’ (a formal legal opinion). Istiftā’ arose om any Muslim
individual’s consultation with a muftī who gave his opinion in the form of a
fatwā or responsa to solve a particular legal problem.
The practically oriented solution given in a fatwā by itself could not be
transformed into a valid legal precept. However, when a large number of
legal cases had accumulated, they o en compiled and transmitted them as
valid legal opinions. Thus, in turn, as is made explicit in Fatāwā-i fīrūzshāhī’s
style, istiftā’ became a genre of posing an ensemble of possible juridical
Published by ScholarlyCommons, 2019
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questions to resolve disputes between divergent legal opinions or clari ing
the appropriateness of speciﬁc forms of action. For instance, the norms for
wuḍū‘ (ablution), a necessary act prior to oﬀering prayer, are demonstrated
by the various forms of hypothetical istiftā’ and responsa given to them.19 Or,
for instance, in Kitāb al-farā’iḍ (book of inheritance), Kirmānī poses one
of the classical problems in inheritance laws. If parents were kāﬁrs (nonbelievers) who became Muslims, did children born prior to their conversion
have the right to inherit property as per the stipulations of Ḥanafī rules?
Kirmānī unambiguously gives an aﬃrmative answer without supplying the
necessary reasoning found in Al-sirājīyya where al-Sajāwandī maintained
that the religious denomination of the parents could not prejudice their
children.20 This is because Kirmānī’s fatāwā were destined for extracting
applicable rules rather than commenting upon the reasons for the formulation of such rules. Even though individuals might have consulted jurisconsults for praxis, advice, and opinion, doctrinal reasoning for legal norms
were grounded in works like Al-sirājīyya. The latter explained the reasoning
behind a rule, which was not a precedent. Precedent was not a valid form of
justi ing legal norms in premodern Islamic law, but reason was.
Furthermore, authoritative fatāwā follow a pattern of regular collections
of legal precepts and reasoning laid out by classical jurists on each topic of
juridical doctrine. They could be personal matters like zakāt (alms), nikāḥ
(marriage), ṭalāq (divorce), hajj (pilgrimage), or those pertaining to civil and
public aﬀairs of a Muslim polity such as the principles of taxation for ‘ushr
(tithe) and kharāj (land tax). This is particularly the case as these genres of
works were meant to be compendia that were read to clari disagreements
among jurists. They do not constitute any resolution by themselves but are
merely the opinions of various jurists to whom the author owes a shared
tradition of belonging as a member of a particular madhhab. However, the
manuscript of Kirmānī’s work does not reveal any such intricacies and
collates a series of questions and answers. The reason for Kirmānī’s method
can be corroborated by the fact that he relies to a large extent on another

19 Sadr al-Dīn Ya‘qūb Muzaﬀar Kirmānī, Fatāwā-i f īrūzshāhī (MS 22831, Andhra Pradesh
Oriental Manuscript Library and Research Institute, Hyderabad), 4–
20 Kirmānī, Fatāwā-i f īrūzshāhī, 4⒘
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loose genre of juridical writing, wāqi‘āt (events) (for example, Wāqi‘āt-i
ḥasāmīyya, Wāqi‘āt-i zahīrīyya, Wāqi‘āt-i ḥāmīyya, etc.). Wāqi‘āt report a collection of real incidents that had taken place (such as legal disputes) and the
legal solutions the jurists oﬀered. These reports and responsa form the primary texts for Kirmānī’s work rather than abstract legal norms. Hence,
manuscript copies of the work do not contain commentaries or detailed
glosses aside om the clariﬁcation of technical terms. Perhaps the absence of
these features suggests that Persian fatāwā had pragmatic rather than doctrinal uses.
Ḥanafī sharḥs (commentaries) in Persian, which appeared later than
fatāwā, are less juridico-technical in nature but are a key to understanding
reading practices. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Sajādil Sirhindī’s Sharḥ-i hidāya, a Persian
commentary on Al-Marghīnānī’s Al-hidāya, survives in a single manuscript, dated 5 November 1694, that was copied by Jān Muḥammad-i
Qaum-i Shaikhzāda-i ‘Abbāsī om Lahore in present-day Pakistan.21
Sajādil Sirhindī also composed a Persian commentary on ‘Ubaid Allah’s
Al-wiqāya al-riwāya fī masā’il al-hidāya, called Masā’il-i sharḥ-i wiqāya. Both
works are dedicated to the Mughal Sultan, Aurangzeb ʻĀlamgı̄r. Sirhindī
says he undertook the Persian commentary on Al-hidāya for the fāyida
(beneﬁt) of ahl-i islām or the “community of Muslims,” as he had done
with his earlier work, Masā’il-i sharḥ-i wiqāya.22 Unfortunately, tadhkiras
(biographical compendia) of Ḥanafī jurists do not provide us with much
information about Sajādil Sirhindī. The earliest reference to Sharḥ-i hidāya
I have been able to trace is John Herbert Harington’s (1765–1828) extended
essay “Remarks upon the Authorities of Mosulman Law.” 23 Harington,

21 The northwestern regions of the Mughal Empire (in particular, the ṣūba [province] of
Lahore) had become a center for the settlement of itinerant émigré Sunni intellectuals not
only om Transoxania but also Iran. Lahore, which was one among Mughal dār al-ṣalṭanat
or imperial capitals alongside Delhi and Agra, also provided opportunities for the ‘ulamā’ to
gain access to courtly services.
22 ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Sajādil Sirhindī, Sharḥ-i hidāya, Ms. 361, India Oﬃce Islamic Collection,
British Library,
23 John Herbert Harington, “Remarks upon the Authorities of Mosulman Law,” Asiatic
Researches; or, the Transactions of the Society instituted in Bengal, For Inquiring into the History
and Antiquities; The Arts, Sciences and Literature, of Asia 10 (1811): 50
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who worked as Persian translator in the British East India Company’s Revenue department in Calcutta, had even suggested editing this text. He
thought a Mughal Persian commentary on Marghīnānī’s work could, a er
all, aid court oﬃcials, British judges, and “native” maulvis better appreciate
Charles Hamilton’s English rendering.24
Several elements within the text indicate that although the work itself is
entitled sharḥ, it is distinct insofar as furū‘ al-ﬁqh texts om the thirteenth
century onward were composed in Arabic in Transoxania and the Middle
East. In the Arabic commentarial tradition, the signiﬁcant manner of
explanation follows the conventional language of ﬁqh texts, which provide
various authorial positions such as Al-Qudūrī’s Mukhtaṣar, Al-hidāya, Alwiqāya and Hāﬁz al-Dīn al-Nasafī’s Kanz al-daqā’iq. Beginning with a classical praise of Allah in Arabic, Sajādil Sirhindī’s manuscript is replete with
interlinear glosses on Qur’anic verses and qawl-i paigambar (ḥadīth, or the
sayings of the prophet). Notably, Sajādil Sirhindī maintains the Arabic stylistic common to fatāwās rather than commentaries, as he indexically refers
to Al-kāfī and Ghāyat al-bayān as authorities by the phrase wa kadhā fī (such
as it is in) to enumerate the legal norm. Had it been a commentary stricto
sensu, Sharḥ-i hidāya would have instead employed huwa kadhā wa kadhā (it
is . . . such and such) to lay out the deﬁnition and explain it.25
How did Persian commentaries exhibit the syllogistic argumentation
method deployed in ﬁqh texts? Sajādil Sirhindī’s recourse to qiyās (analogical
deduction) in kitāb dar bayān-i ṭahārat (kitāb al-ṭahāra in Arabic; the “book
on puriﬁcation”) is limited to the contingent and conventional meaning of
qiyās, the fourth source of law, rather than the hierarchized ordering of
argumentation laid out in the formal doctrine on qiyās.26 Sajādil Sirhindī

24 Maulvis were Muslim legal scholars that the British government recruited to facilitate the
interpretation of laws.
25 Wheeler, “Identity in the Margins,” 18
26 Sajādil Sirhindī, Sharḥ-i hidāya,
In the conventional norms of ﬁqh treatises, kitāb alṭahāra constitutes the introductory book. Charles Hamilton omitted both the ﬁrst book and
the second on kitāb al-ṣalāh or the “book on prayer.” Rather, he begins with the third book,
kitāb al-zakāt (book on alms) as the ﬁrst. This misrepresentation owes to the presumption
that puriﬁcation and prayer were purely ritualistic aspects of religious practice with no consequences for legal relations.
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most o en applies only a fourth type based on similarity between two cases
wherein the original legal norm becomes valid in a new case that displays
shared features with the old case. Rather than construct a syllogistic proposition, Sajādil Sirhindī describes the new case as embodying similar features.
He eschews om explicitly indicating the ratio legis, “the attribute common
to both the new and original cases.”27
Sharḥ-i hidāya occults distinctions of “paraphrasing” and “running”
commentary since the author’s intention is not to condense the main argument. Instead, he provides a loose rendering of the key doctrinal evidence
contained in Al-hidāya, that is, the “sources” that formed the basis of AlMarghīnānī’s writings in the ﬁrst place. Sharḥ-i hidāya is more appropriately
a gloss on juridical texts that falls within the category called ḥāshiya (supercommentary) rather than sharḥ. In premodern manuscripts, ḥāshiya is composed around the text of a treatise or its sharḥ ﬁlling the margins. Ḥāshiya
does not appear independently in manuscripts since it is intended for the
reader to interpret obscure individual elements of a text (terms, propositions, grammatical particularities, logical categories implicit in an argument, etc.). In Sajādil Sirhindī’s work, ḥāshiya takes center place and is
further glossed in interlinear margins by the hand of a reader. Manuscripts
like these were perhaps notes that jurists compiled and used as teaching aids
in madrasas.

Conclusion
Fatāwā and sharḥs constitute a signiﬁcant corpus to understand methods by
which Ḥanafī jurists practiced their juridical thinking, interpreted, and
transmitted their ideas for future generations of scholars. In the Indian
context, the examination of manuscripts reveals juridical hermeneutic practices that are obscured in the highly polarized manner in which the ‘ulamā’

27 Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 2
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(learned scholars) have been represented in the historiography.28 Their
associative role has been analyzed purely in the realm of juridical and
political services they oﬀered to sultans in return for land grants and the
maintenance of educational institutions. More o en, they are assumed to
represent the “orthodox” wing of premodern Islam in India.
The study of juridical texts and manuscripts not only reveals complexity
within doctrinal argumentation but also allows for the diﬀerentiation of
juridical functions that the ‘ulamā’ held. Moreover, Persian renderings of
Islamic jurisprudence, which do not possess Arabic-style, technically speciﬁc formulations, exhibit “hybridity” in their method. Partly, this is due to
the fact that Arabic was the theological language across Islamic cultures. It
was the source of sunna or the foundational texts for sharī‘a: the Qur’ān and
the ḥadīth (prophet’s sayings) as well as “classical” writings (eighth to twel h
centuries) that established patterns for the juridical genre. On the contrary,
Persian ﬁqh works pose challenges, as they do not strictly fall into distinct
categories of commentarial methods that had existed in the historical genealogy of Islamic thought. The signiﬁcance of Persian juridical writings, be
they fatāwā or sharḥs, has to be located in the praxis of Islamic law among
premodern Ḥanafī jurists but also the extent to which they oﬀered juristic
assistance to sultans, nobility and administrative oﬃcers in the “implementation of law.”
Persian, the administrative and court language in large parts of the
Indian subcontinent, acted as an intermediary for the ﬁltration of Islamic
legal precepts; it was also, as we have seen, one of the languages in which
idioms of Islamic law had been extensively produced in the form of fatāwā
and commentaries. No doubt, various forms of law-making other than ﬁqhbased law were prevalent during the Islamicate rule of the Delhi Sultanates
and the Mughal Empire. These laws could range om zawābit (orders) and

28 See Aziz Ahmad, “The Role of Ulema in Indo-Muslim History,” Studia Islamica 31
(1970): 6, for a general trans-historical evaluation. Historiography on the Delhi Sultanates
and the Mughal Empire privileges the spiritual role played by Suﬁ saints due to their “heterodox” and “mystic” visions of polity, religion, and social interaction. The ‘ulamā’ are o en
portrayed negatively as opposed to mysticism, while much of their writings have not yet been
studied.
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dastūr al-‘amal (regulations) promulgated by rulers in Persian to “customary” and institutional practices prevalent in diﬀerent parts of the subcontinent that are available in regional languages. Nevertheless, the use of Persian
was not merely limited to mundane procedures of legal instruments, court
documents, and attestations. Persian also contained an idiom of law-making
within the contours of ﬁqh, to whose manuscript and intellectual histories
we need to be attentive in understanding the premodern legal past of the
subcontinent. In this article, I have laid out a set of themes and propositions
on the genealogy of the Islamic legal tradition in the region, the speciﬁcities
in Persian works, and the epistemological problems related to their interpretation within the general category of “law” as we understand it today.
The dialectic between jurisprudence, law-making, and implementation—
that is, the juridical domains, which I have dealt with in a prefatory form—
conﬁgured as much the political domains of Persian in premodern Hindūstān.
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